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HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY IN URBAN AREAS OF BOLIVIA
Menno Pradhan and Arthur van Soest*
Abstract—We analyze labor supply behavior and the choice between
formal and informal sector work of the two spouses in families in urban
areas of a developing country, using cross-section data from Bolivia drawn
in 1989. The model generalizes the neoclassical family labor supply
model. Nonmonetary returns of formal sector employment capture the fact
that the choice between sectors is not exclusively based on wage
differentials. Wage equations, nonmonetary returns equations, and labor
supply equations are estimated jointly by smooth simulated maximum
likelihood. We find substantial cross-wage elasticities of working hours of
both partners, and large substitution elasticities between the two sectors.
I. Introduction
WEanalyze labor supply behavior of the two partners intwo-adult families in urban areas in Bolivia, using
cross-section data drawn in 1989. We distinguish four types
of labor supplied by the family: husband’s and wife’s hours
of work in the formal sector and in the informal sector. We
present a static structural model, focusing on the relation
between these four types of labor supply, their sensitivity to
all four wages, and other family income.
One objective of this study is to analyze the sensitivity of
household members’ labor supply for their own and their
partner’s wages. In a developing country, household income
is often generated by more than one member of the
household. Poorer families may need more than one income
to reach subsistence level. The labor supply decisions of the
individual family members are likely to be correlated. For
instance, if earnings of one spouse are insufficient, the
partner may decide to work to generate additional family
income.
The point of departure is a neoclassical family labor
supply model. The family is assumed to take joint decisions
regarding household consumption and labor supply of its
members. It maximizes utility, determined by household
consumption and leisure of family members, under a
household budget restriction. This approach is used in many
studies. For example, Hausman and Ruud (1984) extend the
linear labor supply model for two-adult families and apply it
to U.S. data. Kapteyn et al. (1990) apply this model to Dutch
data. Ransom (1987) uses a quadratic utility function to
analyze labor supply of two-adult households. Newman and
Gertler (1994) estimate the labor supply of rural households
of varying size in Peru.
We focus on urban labor markets in a developing country.
In this context it is common practice to distinguish between
a ‘‘formal’’ and an ‘‘informal’’ sector. During a period of
conomic slump with a direct negative effect on formal
sector wages, the informal sector is often seen to expand.
This is referred to as the buffer function of the informal
sector (Todaro (1989)). A second aim of this study is to
analyze whether the choice between formal and informal
sectors is driven by wage considerations only, and how
sensitive it is for wage differentials.
Previous empirical studies that analyze labor supply in
urban areas of a developing country include Magnac (1991),
who extends the basic Roy (1951) model to analyze earnings
i the formal and informal sectors in Columbia. Gindling
(1991) studied wage determination in the labor market of
San Jose´, Costa Rica. Thomas (1992) provides a recent
survey on both theoretical and empirical studies concerning
the informal sector. Our model combines the main features
of Ransom (1987) with those of Magnac (1991).
We use household survey data. Our approach implies that
different utility functions would have to be used for different
household types. We limit ourselves to households with one
prime-agemale and one prime-age female, which we refer to
as two-adult households.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section II
we introduce the data set and provide descriptive statistics.
In section III the model is introduced. Section IV contains
information on the estimation strategy. Results are discussed
in section V, and section VI concludes.
II. Data
The research is based on data of the second round of the
1989 Bolivian household survey (Encuesta Integrada de
Hogares). It uses a random sample of the urban population
and is administered yearly by the Bolivian National Bureau
of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica). The 1989
survey covers 7264 households in eight urban centers. 3712
households contained one prime-age male and one prime-
age female, with both of them potential workers (between 19
and 65 years old, in good health, and not attending full-time
education). The definition of formal and informal sectors is,
following Magnac (1991), based on questions on the work-
ers’ status. Wage workers and independent professionals,
such as lawyers and doctors, are classified as formal, other
self-employed workers are classified as informal. Self-
employed workers with household-related business assets
greater than 15.000 Bolivianos (U.S.$ 5500) are classified as
formal.1 Others, such as family workers or employers, areReceived for publication March 17, 1994. Revision accepted for
publication May 22, 1995.
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not classified.2 476 households were excluded because one
of the partners could not be classified, 146 because one of
the partners had jobs in both sectors. Finally, 48 households
were excluded due to missing information on one of the
necessary variables (education level, hours worked).3
The sample used for estimation thus contains 3042
families.4 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics. 91% of all
males are working, compared to 40% of all females. The
majority of males work in the formal sector, the majority of
females do not participate. Most individuals in the informal
sector have little education; the higher educated dominate in
the formal sector. Ethnic minorities are found more fre-
quently in the informal sector. Average other, nonlabor,
income is highest for those who do not participate. Average
hourly earnings in the formal sector are slightly higher than
in the informal sector.5 Average hours worked are higher in
the informal sector. The hourly earnings distribution of
working males and females in the sample is very similar to
that in the original sample of 7264 families.
Table 2 contains some prima facie evidence of intrahouse-
hold effects of labor supply. We have calculated the average
female participation rate and the average log wage of
working females by wage quintile of the male. The female
participation rate is highest in the lower and upper male
wage brackets. Yet female wages increase with the male’s
wage. The high participation rate in the lower quintile could
be explained by the low income earned by the male—one
income is not enough to support the family. For the high
male wage bracket, the own wage effect of the female seems
to dominate—the high wage she can earn induces her to
work.
2 See Pradhan and van Soest (1995) for details on the classification and
for sample statistics on an individual level.
3 In principle, the likelihood could be adjusted to account for missing
information in hours worked. We did not consider this worth the
effort—only 10 observations would be recovered.
4 For the sample of 3712 households consisting of one prime-age female
and one prime-age male, average per-capita household consumption is
142.8. For the selected sample it is 137.2. This suggests that sample
selectivity due to data cleaning might not be too serious. Compared to the
average in the total survey, per-capita income of two-adult households is
8% lower.
5 For those with one job, hourly earnings are obtained as the ratio of
average earnings and average hours worked. For those with two jobs (in
the same sector), a weighted mean is used. Earnings and hours worked
questions in the survey are identical for the two sectors.




Working Total Formal Informal
Not
Working Total
Basic (5) 0.22 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.10 0.44 0.34 0.43
Inter (8) 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.15
Medio (12) 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.18 0.20 0.29 0.25
Middle technical (13) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05
Higher technical (15) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02
Normal (17) 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.06
University (20) 0.17 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.05
Other 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.10
Marrieda 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.96
Ethnicb 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.24 0.47 0.34 0.36
Age 35.74 37.84 39.55 36.69 34.22 35.72 33.15 33.98
Wagec 2.29 2.22 2.07 1.75
3.21 2.72 1.89 2.36
Hoursd 52.11 53.87 47.92 36.92 45.96 17.72
Standard deviation of hours 17.09 18.01 22.43 15.98 25.83 25.70
Othince 7.72 5.72 37.09 9.79 10.27 7.56 10.65 9.79
Observations 1889 879 274 3042 481 787 1774 3042
Notes: (1) Sector definitions are based on worker status.
(2) Dummy variables ‘‘basic’’ through ‘‘university’’ denote highest levels of education attended. The minimum number of years required for each type is in parentheses. Vocational training is referred to as
‘‘technical.’’ ‘‘Normal’’ includes teacher training for primary education. ‘‘Other’’ includes all other types of education.
aMarried5 1 if married, 0 otherwise.
b Ethnic5 1 if mother tongue is not Spanish, 0 otherwise. It is an indicator for ethnic minorities.
c Wage5 hourly wage rate in Bolivianos (Bs). At the time of the survey 1 Boliviano was about 0.37 U.S. dollar. Income taxes do not play an important role. The bulk of government revenues is collected through a
consumption tax.
dHours5 working hours per week.
e Othinc5 household income (Bs per week) excluding earnings. Othinc5 0 for 84.5% of all families. We did not correct othinc for savings and did not allow for endogeneity of othinc.
TABLE 2.—FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY BY MALE WAGE QUINTILES
Wage Quintile, Male Participation Rate, Female Log Wage, Female
Not working 51.1 0.14
(3.0) (0.07)








5 (rich) 43.9 0.83
(2.1) (0.06)
Notes: Participation rate is in percentages; log female wage is conditional upon working. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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III. The Model
Few individuals hold jobs in both sectors (fewer than 5%),
and these are removed from the sample. Our model therefore
explains sector choice and earnings and hours worked in the
chosen sector, rather than hours worked in both sectors. We
assume that an individual can earn a fixed hourly wage in
each sector, where wages in the two sectors can be different.
The simplest would then be to assume that the individual
chooses the sector with the highest wage rate. This, however,
is not necessarily consistent with the data. We introduce
unobserved nonmonetary returns to explain why people may
choose the sector yielding the lower (monetary) earnings.
The model consists of three parts. The first describes the
wage rates in both sectors for both spouses, excluding
nonmonetary returns. The second part consists of nonmon-
etary returns equations. The choice between formal and
informal sectors is based on comparing wages, including
nonmonetary returns. Wage rates, including nonmonetary
returns, in the optimal sector are input variables for the third
part of the model, the labor supply section. This part
explains joint labor supply decisions of both spouses,
including the decisions of whether to participate (in the
optimal sector) or not. We discuss the three parts of the
model separately.
A. Wages
The log hourly wage in both sectors (excluding nonmon-
etary returns) is modeled as a linear function of exogenous
variables and an error term,
ln wkj 5 Xktkj 1 hkj, hkj , N(0,skj
2 ),
j 5 1(formal), 2(informal), (1)
k5 m(male),f(female).
(The subscript indicating the household has been dropped.)
We use four separate wage equations to describe earnings in
both sectors for both sexes. The error terms are assumed to
be independent of each other and of other error terms in the
model.
B. Nonmonetary Returns and Sector Choice
Under the assumption of homogeneous preferences and
free movement between sectors, everyone chooses the sector
in which the wage offer is the highest. This is the assumption
in the classical Roy (1951) model. In practice, however,
individuals do not necessarily participate in the sector with
the highest wage offer. On the one hand, demand factors may
limit movement between sectors. In particular, the view that
entrance into the formal sector is restricted is widely spread
(Fields (1975)). On the other hand, preferences for sectors
may differ across individuals. For example, apart from
wages, larger freedom in the informal sector or larger job
security in the formal sector may be considered. We capture
such effects under nonmonetary returns to the job. This is the
monetary equivalent of all nonwage factors that influence
sector participation. Magnac (1991) interprets nonmonetary
returns as rationing.
We model nonmonetary returns relative to the monetary
wage. Only the difference between nonmonetary returns in
the two sectors is identified. We normalize nonmonetary
returns in the informal sector to zero. The log of nonmon-
etary returns (NMR) in the formal sector is denoted by
NMRk (k5 m (male), f (female)). It is assumed to be a
function of individual characteristics, local labor market
conditions, and an error term:
ln (NMRk 1 1)5 Vkgk 1 µk,
µk , N(0,sk
2), k5 m, f.
(2)
We assume that the sector choice is determined by wages,
including nonmonetary returns. For the formal sector the
wage isw*k1 5 (NMRk 1 1)wk1 (k5 m, f ). For the informal
sector, the wagewk2 itself enters. The preferred sector and
hourly wage (including nonmonetary returns) are thus given
as follows:
If w*k1 . wk2, then formal sector: w*k 5 w*k1
If w*k1 , wk2, then informal sector: w*k 5 wk2.
(3)
Wages and nonmonetary returns thus determine the choice
between formal and informal sectors. Whether the indi-
vidual will prefer employment in the optimal sector to
nonparticipation will depend onw*m, w*f , and the labor
supply part of the model.
C. Labor Supply
This part of the model is identical to that of Ransom
(1987). A household is characterized by a quadratic direct
utility function which has household consumption and
leisure of both partners as arguments. The family maximizes
utility subject to a household budget constraint and nonnega-
tivity conditions on hours worked:
maxU(Z) 5 aZ2 1⁄2Z8bZ (4)
subject to
w*mhm 1 w*f hf 1 Y5 C
hm $ 0
hf $ 0
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with
Z5 [T2 hm, T2 hf , C]8
T5 time endowment
hm, hf 5 hours worked by male and female
C5 family consumption
Y5 nonlabor income
a 5 (am, af, a3)8 [ R3, b [ R333.
We assume that the budget constraint is binding, i.e.,
utility increases withC. If neither of the two nonnegativity
conditions on hours is binding, first-order conditions can be
written as
a*m 1 a*3w*m 2 b11hm 2 b33w*m(w*mhm 1 w*f hf 1 Y)
2 b12hf 1 b13(2w*mhm 1 w*f hf 1 Y)
1 b23w*mhf 5 0
(5)
a*f 1 a*3w*f 2 b22hf 2 b33w*f(w*mhm 1 w*f hf 1 Y)
2 b12hm 1 b23(2w*f hf 1 w*mhm 1 Y)
1 b13w*f hm 5 0.
(6)
Herea*m anda*f are functions ofa, b, andT (cf. Ransom
(1987)). The quadratic specification implies that there is no
need to specify the time endowmentT. Following Ransom
(1987), we allowa*manda*f to be functions of observed taste
shifters Qki and unobserved taste shifterseki (k5 m, f ),
where the subscripti denotes the household (in the sequel we
omit that subscript for ease of notation):
a*k 5 QkGk 1 ek, k5 m, f, e 5 1emef 2 , N(0,S). (7)
If a nonnegativity constraint is binding and one spouse
does not work, the corresponding first-order condition
changes into an inequality condition. For givenw*m andw*f
this results in a simultaneous model of two tobit equations.
Due to the quadratic utility function, the underlying latent
model is linear.
D. Complete Model
The model consists of eight equations: two wage equa-
tions and one nonmonetary returns equation for each spouse,
and two labor supply equations. Note that the labor supply
part of the model uses wages in levels, while wage equations
and nonmonetary returns are in logs, so that the model as a
whole is nonlinear. Parameters to be estimated aretkj, skj
2
( j 5 1, 2 andk5 m, f ) in equation (1),gk, sk
2 (k5 m, f ) in
equation (2),Gk (k5 m, f ) andS in equation (7), and thebij
(i, j 5 1, 2, 3) in equations (5) and (6). By means of
normalization,b11 is set equal to 1.
The approach is an improvement on the Ransom (1987)
approach in that the wage equations are incorporated and
estimated jointly with the labor supply equations. Ransom
predicted wage offers for nonparticipants using a separate
model, thus ignoring wage rate prediction errors. Further-
more, we distinguish between two sectors. The model also
generalizes the approach of Magnac (1991). Our approach is
more structural, and we do not only consider participation
but also hours worked. Moreover, while Magnac considers
individuals, we work at the household level and analyze
intrahousehold interactions.
It should be admitted that the model is restrictive in
various ways. A more general way to model sector choice
would be to incorporate hours worked in both sectors
separately in the utility function. Family utility would then
depend on five arguments instead of three. The general
solution would allow that individuals work in both sectors
simultaneously, something we hardly observe in our data.
Our model a priori excludes the possibility of two jobs in
two different sectors. Nonmonetary returns can be seen as a
specific way of transforming preferences (proportional to
wages). This implies that the sector choice does not depend
on hours worked.
Restrictions that seem hard to justify from an economic
point of view are those imposed on the covariance matrix of
the error terms.We have eight error terms and only allow for
correlation between two of them (random preferences of the
two spouses). Thus, for example, independence of all errors
in equations (1) and (2) implies that the sector choices of the
two spouses (conditional on exogenous variables) are inde-
pendent. Given our estimation strategy (see below), a more
general covariance structure is feasible in principle. It
would, however, require a substantially larger computing
effort and is thus beyond the scope of the current study.
IV. Estimation
Due to the model’s nonlinear nature, an analytical expres-
sion for the likelihood cannot be given. Exact likelihood
contributions would in many cases require numerical integra-
tion in more dimensions. Instead, we maximize an approxi-
mation of the likelihood, based on simulations of some of
the errors in the wage and nonmonetary returns equations.
This method is an example of (smooth) simulated maximum
likelihood (SML) (cf. Boersch-Supan and Hajivassiliou
(1993), for example). We describe the main idea here.
Details are given in the appendix.
If both partners in a given family work in the informal
sector andw*mandw*f are known, the likelihood contribution
of the labor supply part of the model (conditional on wages)
is identical to that in Ransom (1987). We denote it by
LI(hm, hf 0w*m, w*f ). To keep the notation simple, we suppress
the other arguments on which it depends (taste shifters, other
family income).6 The complete likelihood contribution is
6 Note that, due to the model assumptions (including independence of
errors in equations (1) and (2) from those in equation (7)),LI depends on
the chosen sector throughw*k (k5 m, f ) only.
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then given by
L(hm, hf, sm, sf, w*m, w*f) 5 LI (hm, hf 0w*m, w*f)
3 Lm(sm, w*m)Lf(sf, w*f).
(8)
HereLm andLf are the likelihood contributions of the wage
and nonmonetary returns equations for male and female, and
sm and sf are the observed sectors of male and female.
Because of the linearity of this part of the model and
independence of the errors, computingLm and Lf is easy.
Both are similar to Magnac’s (1991) likelihood. Thus ifw*m
andw*f are known, the exact likelihood contribution can be
used.
This is only relevant, however, if both partners work in
the informal sector. If either of them does not work in the
informal sector, or if the wage is not reported, the relevant
wage (including nonmonetary returns) is not observed. In
case of nonparticipation, this is the familiar problem in
estimating structural labor supply models with unobserved
wage rates (cf. discussion in MaCurdy et al. (1990)). In case
of formal sector work, we observe the monetary wage, but
w*k includes unobserved nonmonetary returns. Let us con-
sider the case that both spouses work in the formal sector.
The likelihood contribution can then be written as
L(hm, hf, sm, wm, wf) 5 E5LI (hm, hf 0w*m, w*f)
3 Lm(sm, w*m)Lf(sf, w*f)6.
(9)
The expectation is taken with respect to the unobserved
errors in the nonmonetary returns equations, linking ob-
servedwm andwf to unobservedw*m andw*f (see appendix).
The expectation cannot be computed analytically, sinceLI is
a complicated function ofw*m andw*f. We replace it by a
simulated mean,
LH(hm, hf, sm, sf, wm, wf) 5 (1/H)o
j51
H
3 [LI (hm, hf 0w*mj, w*fj )
3 Lm(sm,w*mj)Lf(sf,w*fj )].
(10)
Here w*mj and w*fj ( j 5 1, . . . ,H) result from addingH
independent draws ofMk to Vk gk in (2), and adding the
sums to the observed log formal sector wages.
This procedure is easily generalized to other cases. For
those individuals who do not participate, we draw all six
errors in the wage and nonmonetary returns equations. The
maximum wage offer from the two sectors is substituted in
the labor supply part of the model. This type of nonlinearity
was also solved through simulation by Laroque and Salanie´
(1989) for a disequilibrium model. The sample likelihood is
approximated by replacing each likelihood contribution by
its simulated approximation. The SML estimator maximizes
the approximate sample likelihood.7
The estimator is consistent ifN = ` (number of
observations) andH = ` (number of draws per observa-
tion). Moreover, if draws for different observations are
independent andŒN/H = 0 (i.e.,H= ` ‘‘fast enough’’),
SML is asymptotically efficient and equivalent to maximum
likelihood (Gourieroux and Monfort (1993)). Because the
errors in the labor supply part of the model are retained and
not simulated, the approximate likelihood is a continuous
and differentiable function of the parameters. This makes
maximization feasible and should, according to previous
studies on similar models (Boersch-Supan and Hajivassiliou
(1993)), lead to satisfactory results for smallH already. We
useH 5 60.8
7 In principle, simulations could be avoided, since the likelihood
contribution can always be rewritten as a two-dimensional integral (over
w*m and w*f ). The integral could be computed numerically. However,
accurate two-dimensional integration can be quite time consuming and
requires a larger programming effort. Note that, in spite of the indepen-
dence assumptions, the double integral cannot be written as the product of
two single integrals because of the factorLI.
8H 5 30 leads to virtually identical results. Similarly, Pradhan (1993)
finds, for a similar model, that increasing the number of draws further
hardly changes the results.










Age squared/100 21.993 22.527
(0.411) (0.544)
Skk (k5 m, f ) 7.955 2.833
(0.309) (0.862)
Smf 5 21.859 (0.539)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.








Female leisure 20.243 0.270
(0.045) (0.046)
Consumption (/10) 20.181 20.183 0.0078
(0.022) (0.026) (0.0014)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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V. Results
We first present the estimates of the labor supply model,
equations (4)–(7). The estimates ofGmandGf in equation (7)
are given in table 3. A higher value ofa*k (k5 m, f ) is
associated with a higher propensity to work, sincea*k
decreases withak. Exogenous variables inQk refer to family
composition and age. The number of children (age# 18) in
the household (young) significantly increases the propensity
to work for males and has the opposite effect for females.
The number of household members older than 64 (old) is
insignificant. A quadratic age pattern is significant for both
males and females. The propensity to work is highest at age
33 for males and at age 42 for females. There is a significant
negative correlation between the two random preference
terms. This could be due to assortative matching between
spouses.
The estimates for the matrixb are presented in table 4. All
coefficients are significant. The marginal utility of leisure
increases with additional leisure of the partner. Marginal
utility of both partners increases with family consumption.
In the first-order conditions, equations (5) and (6), we have
implicitly assumed that utility increaseswith family consump-
tion. According to our results, this is the case for 2939 out of
3042 observations. The 103 remaining observations are
ignored in the simulations below. Moreover, the solution of
the Lagrange equations corresponds to the utility maximum
if the utility function is quasiconcave. Positive definiteness
of b is sufficient but not necessary for this. Despite the fact
that the estimate ofb is not positive definite, concavity
conditions are satisfied without exception.9
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the shape of the labor supply
curves. Family characteristics are kept at the mean predicted
value. Figure 1 shows unconditional supply curves, i.e.,
predicted numbers of hours worked for males and females as
a function of both wages (including nonmonetary returns).10
a*m anda*f are set equal to their sample means (a*m 5 4.0,
a*f 5 21.4), random terms in preferences are set equal to
zero. Male labor supply is forward bending in most of the
9 This also implies that the model is coherent, in the sense that
endogenous variables are uniquely determined (cf. van Soest et al. (1993)).
10 Estimated sample averages of wages (including nonmonetary returns)
are 6.6 for males and 3.0 for females.
FIGURE1.—LABOR SUPPLYFUNCTIONS
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range of male wages, and backward bending for very high
wage rates, where the income effect dominates the substitu-
tion effect. Ifw*f is low, the female does not work, and male
hours depend onw*m only. If the female works, male hours
are affected negatively by the female’s wage. The wife’s
hours of work increase with her own wage and decrease with
the husband’s wage.
Figure 2 shows the probability of participation for both
males and females as a function of both wages. Random
preference terms are taken into account.11 For females, the
own wage effect on the probability of working is positive.
The effect is stronger if the male wage is low. The effect of
the husband’s wage on the wife’s participation is negative
but small. For the family characteristics considered, the
probability that the male participates is always higher than
0.80. For the male there is a small positive own wage effect
and a negligible cross-wage effect. Only for extremely high
female wages, a substantial negative cross-wage effect is
found.
The estimates of wage and nonmonetary returns equations
for both sexes are presented in table 5. In the wage equations
we have included individual characteristics such as age,
education level, ethnicity, and variables describing local
labor market conditions such as the local unemployment rate
and a measure for the size of the economically active
population, a proxy for the size of the local market. The
specification is similar to that in Pradhan and van Soest
(1995), and so are the results. For example, returns to
education are larger in the formal sector than in the informal
sector. This may indicate that the formal sector requires
skills obtained through the formal education system or that
education is used as a screening device in the formal sector.
A larger local labor market leads to a higher wage. The effect
is significant for males in the formal and for females in the
informal sector. The significantly negative effect of the local
unemployment rate is largest in the informal sector. This can
be explained by the fact that the informal sector is more
competitive than the formal sector. In the formal sector,
ethnic minorities are paid significantly less than others.
In the nonmonetary returns equations for the formal sector
we have included the variables of the wage equations and
11 This is in contrast with figure 1. Excluding random preference terms
would imply that participation probabilities would be 0 or 1.
FIGURE2.—PARTICIPATION PROBABILITIES
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two taste shifters: the numbers of young and old persons in
the family. Nonmonetary returns may result from demand-
side constraints (rationing) or from individual preferences
concerning sector participation. For both males and females
we find that ‘‘normal’’ education (primary school teachers)
has positive nonmonetary returns. People with this type of
training prefer teaching in a primary school (in the formal
sector) to informal sector work. If preferences do not depend
on ethnicity, the negative coefficient on ‘‘ethnic’’ can be
interpreted as high job search costs of ethnic minorities for
formal sector jobs, or discrimination. Ethnic groups are thus
discriminated against twice: formal wages are lower, and
formal sector jobs are harder to find. The number of young
children increases preference for informal sector jobs. This
could be because of higher flexibility of when and howmuch
to work in the informal sector. Also, additional income could
be generated in the informal sector by child labor. The
hypothesis of weakly competitive markets (all parameters in
the nonmonetary returns equation equal zero), as defined by
Magnac (1991), is strongly rejected for both males and
females.
A. Simulations
To see how well the model predicts the distribution of
hours worked and sector participation, we present figure 3
and table 6. For all observations in the sample we have
simulated wages, nonmonetary returns, and hours worked,
taking one draw from the distribution of the error terms.12 In
figure 3 the predicted and the actual sample distributions of
hours worked are shown. Actual hours distributions for
males are peaked at 40 and 48 hours per week. These peaks
are not fully captured by the predictions. This would require
a model incorporating restrictions on hours worked, as in
Dickens and Lundberg (1993). Flexibility of female hours is
much higher; both actual and predicted hours are more
dispersed.
In table 6 we present sector choice and participation of
both spouses.13 We compare actual and predicted numbers.
The model underpredicts the number of nonparticipants,
particularly for males. Explanations may be fixed costs of
working or a lack of available part-time jobs. The ratios of
formal and informal sector participation rates are predicted
reasonably well.
In table 7 we present the results of some simulation
exercises. The objective of the first two simulations is to
examine the importance of intrahousehold effects. We first
consider a 10% fall of wages for all males. This has hardly
any effect on the average number of hours the male works.
Participation of males slightly decreases. Labor supply of
females, however, shows a stronger response: their average
number of hours worked increases by 2.5%, corresponding
to a cross-labor supply elasticity of20.25. A closer look at
the own labor supply response for males reveals that the low
elasticity is not uniform over the sample. Males with a
positive labor supply response are those who initially had a
high wage. For most males with a low wage, the labor
supply response to a wage decrease is negative. This
corresponds with the inverted U-shape of labor supply in
figure 1.
Second, we consider a 10% fall of wage rates of females.
This has a very small effect on hours worked by males and
females. Male hours increase and female hours decrease, but
both effects are less than 1%. To get some insight in
aggregate income elasticities, we also performed a simula-
tion in which nonlabor income increased by 10% for all
households. For 84% of the households this has no effect,
since their nonlabor income was zero to start with. The
12 Using more than one draw yields virtually identical results.
13 Tables 6 through 8 are based on the 2939 observations for which utility
increases with family consumption.
TABLE 5.—ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FORWAGE EQUATIONS
AND NONMONETARY RETURNS (NMR) EQUATIONS
Male Female
Formal Informal NMR Formal Informal NMR
Constant 21.169 0.476 2.283 21.781 20.750 21.869
(0.277) (0.376) (0.453) (0.569) (0.497) (0.960)
Age 0.611 0.240 0.196 0.630 0.451 1.007
(0.133) (0.165) (0.236) (0.276) (0.230) (0.528)
Age squared 20.645 20.244 20.680 20.784 20.485 21.376
(0.171) (0.199) (0.300) (0.366) (0.287) (0.708)
Inter 0.175 20.049 20.325 0.600 0.184 0.172
(0.060) (0.073) (0.105) (0.136) (0.098) (0.228)
Medio 0.377 0.127 20.068 0.851 0.188 0.246
(0.051) (0.069) (0.073) (0.124) (0.087) (0.199)
Midtech 0.665 0.205 20.079 1.197 0.077 0.961
(0.108) (0.179) (0.230) (0.150) (0.187) (0.232)
Hightech 0.835 0.319 20.114 1.161 0.736 1.499
(0.116) (0.231) (0.271) (0.238) (0.273) (0.318)
Normal 0.611 20.441 0.254 1.357 0.145 2.579
(0.099) (0.173) (0.144) (0.131) (0.242) (0.190)
University 1.239 0.085 20.086 1.868 0.427 1.195
(0.059) (0.103) (0.093) (0.126) (0.167) (0.225)
Other 0.541 20.113 0.481 0.139 20.251 20.575
(0.089) (0.168) (0.138) (0.171) (0.120) (0.302)
Miss years 0.084 0.015 0.011 0.124 0.026 0.140
(0.014) (0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.050)
Econ act 0.154 0.038 20.314 0.109 0.167 20.067
(0.028) (0.044) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.079)
Unemployed 20.601 21.242 20.544 20.518 20.951 20.367
(0.117) (0.172) (0.189) (0.222) (0.207) (0.250)
Ethnic 20.137 20.069 20.379 20.162 0.012 20.201





s 0.737 0.794 1.285 0.700 0.899 1.210
(0.009) (0.018) (0.038) (0.023) (0.021) (0.055)
Notes: Education level is incorporated as follows. First, dummies are used to indicate the highest level
of courses attended. Second, for those who did not complete the course, we used the deviation between the
level attained and the level if completed, expressed in years (‘‘miss years’’). This deviation is zero if the
course is finished and negative otherwise. ‘‘Econ act’’ is the number of working or searching individuals in
the sample per urban center. See table 1 for other variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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effects were quite small. For both males and females, hours
worked decrease slightly. Income elasticities are 0.002 for
males and 0.019 for females.
Finally, an objective of this study is to see how sensitive
sector choice and participation are for wage changes in one
sector. We consider a fall in all formal sector wages by 10%
(see tables 7 and 8).14 2.1% of all males switch from formal
to informal sector while the participation rate for males
hardly changes. Participation of females increases by 0.4%.
This is a result of two opposite effects: an increase due to
reduced partner’s earnings (cf. previous simulation), and a
decrease due to the fall of the own (formal sector) wage. The
average number of hours worked increases for both males
and females. The labor supply of males increases since
14 This fall could, for example, be induced by raising income taxes in the
formal sector or a cut in government wages. A change in informal sector














Wage offer, 2.11 20.211 0 20.135
male (0.04) (0.004) (0.005)
Wage offer, 1.52 0 20.152 20.052
female (0.04) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours, male 47.48 47.38 20.033 0.100 0.081
(0.53) (0.038) (0.013) (0.030)
Percent 90.68 96.85 20.117 0.060 20.015
working (0.22) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058)
Hours, 17.05 16.91 0.428 20.136 0.290
female (0.70) (0.036) (0.029) (0.030)
Percent 40.76 42.42 0.826 20.743 0.433
working (0.87) (0.188) (0.161) (0.168)
Household 124.79 137.95 29.088 22.913 26.491
income (2.24) (0.230) (0.148) (0.267)
Notes: Sample averages and changes of sample averages. Standard errors are in parentheses, based on
400 draws from estimated asymptotic distribution of estimator ofb. Wage and income excluding
nonmonetary returns.
FIGURE3.—HOURSDISTRIBUTIONS
TABLE 6.—CROSSTABULATION OF PERCENT SECTOR PARTICIPATION FOR MALE AND FEMALE
Female⇒
Male⇓
Female Informal Not Working Total
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Formal 10.8 9.9 12.2 15.7 38.0 39.4 62.0 64.9
Informal 2.8 4.7 10.2 10.0 16.6 16.5 29.7 31.3
Not working 1.4 1.0 3.4 1.3 4.6 1.6 9.3 3.8
Total 15.0 15.6 25.8 27.0 59.2 57.4 100 100
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formal sector workers are generally in the higher income
brackets. The size of the informal sector increases by 5.5%.
This prediction should be viewed as an upper limit, since a
fall in formal sector wage offers will often be accompanied
by a fall in informal sector wages.
VI. Conclusions
We have analyzed the labor supply behavior and the
choice between formal and informal sector work of the two
spouses in two-adult families in urban areas of Bolivia. We
have developed a static neoclassical model, combining the
family labor supply model of Ransom (1987) with the model
explaining sector choice and earnings of Magnac (1991).
Our main empirical conclusion is that intrahousehold effects
are substantial: low earnings of the husband are compen-
sated by more working hours of the wife. Qualitatively, the
elasticities we find are largely in line with the findings of
Ransom (1987) for the United States. We find a smaller own
wage elasticity of female labor supply than Ransom, and a
larger cross-wage elasticity of female labor supply. Apart
from large differences between the populations of interest,
this may also be due to the model specification. Our
approach allows for a more flexible wage structure than
Ransom’s. The significant differences between wage equa-
tions for the two sectors indicate that this is a substantial
improvement.
Second, we find that lower wages in the formal sector
induce more people to work in the informal sector, while the
effect on nonparticipation is small. Third, we find that
nonmonetary returns in the formal sector are usually posi-
tive. This implies that, on average, if the formal and informal
sector wages are equal, people prefer a formal sector job. It
can be explained by differences in job characteristics. This
finding is different from that of Magnac (1991), who finds
that nonmonetary returns are insignificant for married fe-
males in Columbia. We find larger nonmonetary returns for
males than for females. For females, nonmonetary returns
are particularly important for some education levels, for
example, for those with teacher training. Differences in
educational systemsmight explain part of the deviation from
Magnac’s findings.
Although our model captures some features of the data
quite well, a simulation makes clear that it is not fully
capable to reproduce the data. In particular, nonparticipation
of males is underpredicted. Allowing for fixed costs of
working or constraints on hours worked might help to
overcome this problem. Relaxing the tight stochastic specifi-
cation might also help. The quadratic specification of the
utility function, together with the estimation method of
smooth simulated maximum likelihood, make these exten-
sions feasible areas of future research.
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APPENDIX
Simulated Likelihood Contributions
The likelihood contributions consist of three parts,LI, Lm, andLf, as
introduced in equation (8).LI is the contribution of the labor supply part of











Formal 66.2 22.06 15.2 20.68
(0.86) (0.22) (0.58) (0.17)
Informal 30.7 2.05 27.3 1.12
(0.83) (0.22) (0.81) (0.20)
Not working 3.2 0.02 57.6 20.43
(0.22) (0.06) (0.87) (0.17)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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the model, for given wagesw*m and w*f of males and females. The
expression forLI is given in Ransom (1987).Lm andLf are the likelihood
contributions of wage equations and nonmonetary returns for males and
females, respectively. Because males and females are treated identically,
LmandLf are similar. We first consider theLm.
If the male works in the formal sector,wm is observed, butw*m is not
because of nonmonetary returns. If µm, the error in the NMR equation,






where fkj denotes the (normal) probability density function (pdf) ofhkj.
Lm(µm) is thus easy to compute.
If the male works in the informal sector, we observew*m. Nonmonetary




g(µm 1 hm1)d(µm 1 hm1) fm2(hm2) (A.2)
whereg is the (normal) pdf of µm 1 hm1.
If the male does not participate, we don’t know whether the informal or
the formal sector wage is relevant, and we must condition onhm1, hm2, and
µm. Lmequals 1 and vanishes. The wage that enters intoLmequals
w*m(hm1, hm2, µm) 5 exp [max (Xmtm1 1 hm1
1 Vmgm 1 µm, Xmtm2 1 hn2)].
(A.3)
Lf is calculated in a similar way. The full likelihood contribution of the
family is given by the expectation ofLILmLf with respect to the error terms
that we conditioned on. For example, if the husband works in the formal
sector and the wife does not participate, the exact likelihood contribution is
given by
L (hm, hf, sm, wm) 5 e LI (hm, hf; w*m(µm), w*f (hf1, h f2, µf ))
3 Lm(µm) f (µm, h f1, µf2, µf )dµmdh f1dh f2dµf
(A.4)
wheref denotes the (normal) pdf of (µm, hm1, hf2 , µf). The four-dimensional
integral in equation (A.4) cannot be computed analytically, becauseLI i a
complicated nonlinear function ofw*m and w*f. It is replaced by the
simulated mean





5LI (hm, hf; w*m(µmj), w*f (h f1j, h f2j, µfj ))Lm(µmj)6
(A.5)
where (µmj, h f1j, h f2j, µfj), j 5 1, . . . ,H, are independently and identically dis-
tributed draws from the distribution of (µm, h f1, h f2 , µf). Other cases are
treated in a similar way. The integral to be replaced varies from six
dimensional (hm 5 hf 5 0) to zero dimensional (male and female work in
the informal sector).
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